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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The General Assembly enacted legislation dealing with wills, 
trusts, and estates that added or amended a number of sections of 
the Virginia Code in its 2005 Session. In addition, there were two 
opinions from the Supreme Court of Virginia that presented is-
sues of interest to the general practitioner as well as to the spe-
cialist in wills, trusts, and estates during the period covered by 
this review. This article reports on all of these legislative and ju-
dicial developments. 1 
II. LEGISLATION 
A Trusts-Uniform Trust Code (2000) 
The Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"),2 which was introduced and 
carried over in the 2004 Session, 3 was enacted in a modified form 
in the 2005 Session,4 to be effective July 1, 2006.5 With Virginia's 
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, they will 
often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated, 
those section numbers will refer to the most recent version of the section to which refer-
ence is being made. 
2. UNIF. TRUST CODE (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 177 (Supp. 2005). Copies of the Act, 
containing the Commissioners' Official Comments, which will be indispensable in seeking 
to completely understand the Act's operation, may be obtained from the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 211 East Ontario Street, Suite 1300, Chi-
cago, IL 50511. 
3. S.B. 506, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2004). 
4. Act of Apr. 6, 2005, ch. 935, 2005 Va. Acts 1793 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 55-541.01 to -551.06 (Cum. Supp. 2005)). 
5. Id. As introduced, the Virginia UTC stated that "[t]his chapter applies to express 
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passage, the UTC has now been enacted by fifteen jurisdictions. 6 
This project of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, which is described by that body as "the first na-
tional codification of the law of trusts," also "contains a number of 
innovative provisions."7 One of the UTC's goals is to "provide 
States with precise, comprehensive, and easily accessible guid-
ance on trust law questions. On issues on which States diverge or 
on which the law is unclear or unknown, the Code will for the 
first time provide a uniform rule. "8 Consistent with its further 
goal of enhancing flexibility, "[m]ost of the Uniform Trust Code 
consists of default rules that apply only if the terms of the trust 
fail to address or insufficiently cover a particular issue."9 
During the carryover period between the 2004 and 2005 Ses-
sions, the UTC was subjected to an exhaustive study by the Wills, 
Trusts, and Estates Section of the Virginia Bar Association, led 
by a subcommittee chaired by John E. Donaldson, Emeritus Pro-
fessor of Law, at the College of William and Mary's Marshall-
Wythe School of Law. This study led to the amendment of many, 
and the elimination of some, UTC provisions, along with the 
amendment of nine10 and the repeal of twenty-nine11 sections of 
the Virginia Code. Although a detailed comparison of the UTC to 
prior Virginia law is not feasible within the confines of this arti-
trusts." S.B. 891, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2005). During the legislative process, it 
was amended to read that "[t)his chapter applies to express inter vivos trusts [and it) also 
applies to testamentary trusts, except to the extent ... it is clearly inapplicable to them." 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-541.02(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
6. The other fourteen jurisdictions are Arkansas, District of Columbia, Kansas, 
Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. See UTCproject.org Home Page, http://www. 
UTCproject.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). 
Id. 
7. UNIF. TRUST CODE (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 177, 178 (Supp. 2005). 
Among the more significant [of these innovative provisions) are specification 
of the rules of trust law that are not subject to override in the trust's 
terms ... , the inclusion of a comprehensive article on representation of bene-
ficiaries ... , rules on trust modification and termination that will enhance 
flexibility ... , and the inclusion of an article collecting the special rules per-
taining to revocable trusts. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. The following sections of the Virginia Code were amended and reenacted: §§ 26-
5.2, -30, -51, -66, 37.1-110, 55-7, -60, -277.4, and 64.1-73. See Act of Apr. 6, 2005, ch. 935, 
2005 Va. Acts 1793. 
11. The following sections of the Virginia Code were repealed:§§ 26-5.1, -49, -53, -54, 
-55, -64, -65, 38.2-3120, 55-7.1, -7.2, -19, -19.3, -19.4, -27 to -34, and 64.1-67.2. See Act of 
Apr. 6, 2005, ch. 935, 2005 Va. Acts 1793. 
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cle, there are several excellent sources to which the practitioner 
may refer for a Virginia-specific and for a general explanation of 
the UTC. Professor Donaldson, and Robert T. Danforth, Associate 
Professor of Law at the Washington and Lee University School of 
Law, also a member of the Virginia Bar Association study com-
mittee, have co-authored a comprehensive, Virginia-oriented arti-
cle for this issue of the Annual Survey of Virginia Law, to which 
the reader is referred for a discussion of Virginia's new trust 
code. 12 The general resource would be the Official Comments to 
the UTC prepared by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
in which the Commissioners explain what they meant by what 
they said and which also serves as the legislative history for the 
"uniform" portion of Virginia's modified UTC. 13 
B. Fiduciary Investments-"Mini" Legal List 
In response to a joint study of fiduciary investments by the 
Virginia Bar Association and the Virginia Bankers Association 
that was requested by the 1991 Session, the 1992 Session re-
placed Virginia's traditional prudent man rule with a portfolio-
oriented prudent investor rule, and replaced Virginia's nine-page, 
twenty-seven-category legal list14 with a one-page, three-category 
"mini" legal list. 15 Following a later study by the Virginia Bar As-
sociation, the 1999 Session replaced Virginia's 1992 prudent in-
vestor rule with the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and made con-
forming changes to the mini legal list. 16 
The mini legal list, which is found in Virginia Code section 26-
40.01, identifies a number of investments within the three follow-
12. See generally John E. Donaldson & Robert T. Danforth, Annual Survey of Virginia 
Law: The Virginia Uniform Code, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 325 (2005). 
13. In this connection, see Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Indemnity Insurance 
Co., 186 Va. 204, 209, 42 S.E.2d 298, 301 (1947), wherein the Supreme Court of Virginia 
stated that "[w)hen the legislature of one State adopts a statute of another State, such leg-
islature is presumed to have adopted the construction placed upon it by the courts of that 
State." For ordering information for the Official Comments, see supra note 2. 
14. Although the original legal list was replaced for most purposes, it was not re-
pealed but, instead, was restricted to investments made by the Virginia Housing Devel-
opment Authority and the Virginia Resources Authority. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-40 (Rep!. 
Vol. 2004). 
15. These developments are discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 873, 890-91 (1992). 
16. These developments are discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1075, 1075-76 (1999). 
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ing broad categories: (1) "Obligations of the Commonwealth, its 
agencies and political subdivisions;"17 (2) "Obligations of the 
United States;"18 and (3) "Savings accounts, time deposits or cer-
tificates of deposit."19 Most importantly, Virginia Code section 26-
40.01 provides that a fiduciary investing in these categories "shall 
be conclusively presumed to have been prudent in investing the 
funds."20 When this section came before the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Scott v. United 
States,21 the court focused on this language and concluded that 
"[a]s unfair as it may prove to be to the beneficiaries, a trustee in 
Virginia may arbitrarily decide to invest one hundred percent of 
the assets of a trust in United States Savings Bonds and he will 
be deemed to have met the 'prudent investor' standard."22 
In this regard, it should be noted that when the 1999 Session 
adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, it knowingly re-
enacted the mini legal list and its immunity provision in order to 
provide a safe haven for the layperson who agrees to be a fiduci-
ary as an accommodation to a friend or family member, and who 
may not have the education or the sophistication to understand 
the intricacies of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act or the need to 
retain a professional investment advisor who does.23 In this con-
text, and in the belief that the immunity of the mini legal list 
should be confined to fiduciaries of smaller trust estates that one 
might expect to be administered by a layperson, legislation seek-
ing to limit the protection of the mini legal list to $100,000 was 
introduced in the 2003 Session, but it failed. 24 Similar legislation 
that would have restricted this limitation on protection to 
$1,000,000 was introduced in the 2004 Session, but it also 
17. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-40.0l(B)(l) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
18. Id. § 26-40.0l(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
19. Id. § 26-40.0l(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
20. Id. § 26-40.0l(B) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
21. 186 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Va. 2002), affd, 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003). The dis-
trict court opinion is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: 
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 357, 384-85 (2002). 
22. Scott, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 668. 
23. See H.B. 841, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 28, 
1999, ch. 772, 1999 Va. Acts 1356) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-40 (Repl. 
Vol. 2004)). 
24. H.B. 1979, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2003). It is not clear whether the 
$100,000 amount related to the overall size of the trust fund or to the amount of the trust 
fund invested under the mini legal list. 
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failed. 25 When similar legislation was introduced in the 2005 Ses-
sion, again with a $1,000,000 limitation on protection, the limita-
tion provision in the bill was deleted in favor of the following new 
subsection that was enacted: "Nothing in this section shall relieve 
a fiduciary of his obligation, pursuant to§ 26-45.3, to comply with 
the provisions of the prudent investor rule."26 Although this sub-
section was enacted, it is not believed that its language accom-
plishes the goal of making fiduciaries who invest pursuant to the 
mini legal list subject to the prudent investor rule. To say that it 
does would be to ignore the language contained in the mini legal 
list clearly stating that fiduciaries investing thereunder "shall be 
conclusively presumed to have been prudent in investing the 
funds."27 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the Prudent 
Investor Act itself provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in 
... [§] 26-40.01, a trustee28 who invests and manages trust assets 
owes a duty to the beneficiaries of the trust to comply with the 
prudent investor rule set forth in this Act."29 Lastly, interpreting 
the 2005 legislation as making fiduciaries who invest pursuant to 
the mini legal list subject to the prudent investor rule would have 
the practical effect of repealing Virginia Code section 26-40.01 be-
cause it would no longer have any reason to exist. And, surely, 
had the General Assembly intended to repeal Virginia Code sec-
tion 26-40.01 it would have done so directly, instead of gelding it 
by the addition of the 2005 amendment. 
In the event that the mini legal list does return to the General 
Assembly for further tinkering which, considering its history, 
seems likely, it is submitted that consideration should be given to 
extending its immunity provisions to custodians under the Vir-
ginia Uniform Transfers to Minors Act30 and custodial trustees 
under the Virginia Uniform Custodial Trust Act.31 The typical fi-
duciaries serving for minors and incapacitated persons under 
these acts would clearly fit within the category of persons the 
25. H.B. 140, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2004). 
26. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-40.0l(E) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
27. Id. § 26-40.0l(B) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
28. Virginia Code section 26-45.13 provides, in part, that "[a]s used in this article, the 
term 'trustee' includes any fiduciary as defined in § 8.01-2 and any attorney in fact or 
agent acting for a principal under a written power of attorney." Id.§ 26-45.13 (Repl. Vol. 
2004). 
29. Id. § 26-45.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis added). 
30. Id.§§ 31-37 to -59 (Repl. Vol. 2004). 
31. Id. §§ 55-34.1 to -34.19 (Repl. Vol. 2003). 
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mini legal list was designed to protect, i.e., laypersons adminis-
tering a modest fund as an accommodation to a friend or family 
member. However, the investment standard under both of these 
acts at present is that which "would be observed by a prudent 
person dealing with such person's own property."32 This standard, 
which is a Virginia variation in both acts, is more relaxed than 
the one recommended by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws which, instead of focusing on 
what a prudent person "dealing with such person's own property" 
would do, states the investment standard for these fiduciaries as 
what a prudent person "dealing with property of another" would 
do.33 Nevertheless, this relaxed Virginia rule for these fiduciaries 
dates to a bygone era, and their original Virginia treatment 
would be better replicated in present law by including them in 
the list of fiduciaries who are entitled to the protection of the mini 
legal list. 34 
C. Testamentary Trustee-Waiver of Accounting 
Notwithstanding the general rule of Virginia Code section 26-
17 .3 requiring all court-qualified fiduciaries to account before a 
commissioner of accounts,35 Virginia Code section 26-17.7 creates 
an exception for trustees of testamentary trusts wherein the tes-
tator expressly waives this obligation.36 The 2005 Session 
amended this statute to extend its waiver of accounting provision 
to cases where a "sole beneficiary" is also a trustee.37 For the pur-
32. Id. § 31-48(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004); see id. § 55-34. 7 (Repl. Vol. 2003). 
33. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT, § 12(b), SC U.L.A. 49-50 (2001); UNIF. 
CUSTODIAL TRUST ACT, § 7, 7A U.L.A. 117 (2002). The rather obvious theory is that a pru-
dent person would take a greater degree of risk in personal investing than when investing 
for another. 
34. As presently used in the mini legal list, the term "fiduciary" includes only those 
listed in Virginia Code section 8.01-2 and agents under a written power of attorney. See 
VA. CODE ANN. § 26-40.0l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005). This same language, defining "trustee," 
identifies those fiduciaries subject to Virginia's Prudent Investor Act. See id. § 26-45.13 
(Repl. Vol. 2004). 
35. Id.§ 26-17.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004). 
36. Id.§ 26-17.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005). If the will in question was probated prior to 
July 1, 1993, it is also necessary for the trustee to obtain beneficiary consent as outlined in 
Virginia Code section 26-17.7(D). See id.§ 26-17.7(0) (Cum. Supp. 2005); J. Rodney John-
son, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 895, 
851-52 (2001). 
37. Act of Mar. 26, 2005, ch. 821, 2005 Va. Acts 1355 (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN.§ 26-17.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005)). Note that the sole beneficiary does not have 
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pose of this new rule, the term "sole beneficiary" is defined as 
meaning 
a person who is (i) the only income beneficiary who is entitled to the 
principal, or the remaining principal goes to the trustee's [sic] estate 
or (ii) the only income beneficiary and has either a general power of 
appointment over the principal or has a special power of appoint-
ment that is not limited to a particular class ofpersons.38 
As beneficiary protection is the primary justification for the 
statutory accounting requirement, it appears to make sense to 
eliminate this requirement where the only beneficiary also serves 
as trustee, whether acting alone or with others, on the theory 
that the law does not need to protect one from oneself. Indeed, 
this same theory is embodied in a somewhat similar provision 
that waives the default surety requirement applicable to personal 
representatives if all of the intestate distributees or testate bene-
ficiaries are also personal representatives.39 However, there is a 
difference between these two cases when the sole beneficiary is 
only one of the fiduciaries. The life-long duration of a trusteeship, 
and the decline that naturally accompanies increasing age, sug-
gests that a beneficiary/trustee may ultimately drop "out of the 
loop," vis-a-vis the trust's active administration, and the trust 
will then be under the de facto sole stewardship of the nonbenefi-
ciary/trustee who will nevertheless not have a duty to account be-
cause of the continuing technical presence of the benefici-
ary/trustee. In addition, the need for the present provision, as 
measured by its likely rate of incidence, seems doubtful, and its 
language creates several interpretation problems. 
Looking at the first part of the definition of "sole beneficiary" in 
clause (i), where the only income beneficiary is also "entitled" to 
the principal, it would be most unusual for a will to say "income 
to X, and principal to X."40 And, if one did, it would appear that 
any court would simply terminate the trust and give all of its as-
sets to X via a functional application of the doctrine of merger. 
Looking at the second part of the definition of "sole beneficiary" in 
to be the "sole" trustee, only "a" trustee, for the waiver provision to apply. See id. 
38. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-17.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
39. See id. § 64.1-121 (Rep!. Vol. 2002). 
40. Although one also might think of the case where a will says "to X for life with X to 
have a general power of appointment over principal," such a power could not have been 
intended to be covered by the "entitled" language of clause (i), because it is specifically in-
cluded as a part of the definition in clause (ii). See id. § 26-17.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
388 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:381 
clause (i), one wonders when a prudent attorney would draft a 
trust providing for the income to go X for life with the remainder 
to go to X's estate.41 By providing for the property to go to X's es-
tate upon X's death, the property in question would, for example, 
(1) have to be administered as a part of X's estate and thus be 
subjected to unnecessary administrative expenses, (2) be liable to 
the claims of X's creditors (after X's death) and the creditors of X's 
estate, and (3) be subjected to unnecessary taxation if X's estate 
is (or because of this addition becomes) subject to federal and Vir-
ginia estate taxes.42 As all of the foregoing problems could be 
eliminated, while still achieving the testator's presumed goals, by 
simply providing for the income to go to X for life with the re-
mainder to go to the same persons who succeed to X's estate, it 
seems unlikely that the language of clause (i)'s second part (to X 
for life, remainder to X's estate) will ever be used. 
The problem with the alternative definition of"sole beneficiary" 
in clause (ii) lies in the language "a special power of appointment 
that is not limited to a particular class of persons."43 This lan-
guage is inconsistent with established property law, which de-
fines a special power of appointment as one wherein "the ap-
pointment is restricted to particular persons or a particular class 
of persons."44 It is possible that this provision was meant to iden-
tify the broadest possible power of appointment that is excluded 
from the definition of a general power of appointment for federal 
estate tax purposes, i.e., one that is not "exercisable in favor of 
the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his es-
41. Estate planners know that one way to qualify for the federal estate tax marital 
deduction is via the "estate trust" which does require the principal to pass to the surviving 
spouse's estate. However, this "is the only form of trust qualifying for the federal estate 
tax marital deduction under § 2056 that does not require annual payment of all trust in-
come to the surviving spouse for life." See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Estate Tax Marital Deduc-
tion, 843-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-69. Such a trust would typically be used when income is 
to be accumulated, instead of distributed, or when there is likely to be little or no income 
because the trust's assets will be underproductive or unproductive property. Thus, this 
form of trust is inconsistent with the definition's requirement that, in addition to principal 
going to X's estate at death, X be entitled to all income for life. 
42. In some cases, it might be preferable to expose assets to an estate tax in X's estate 
in order to avoid the imposition of a generation-skipping transfer tax at a higher rate upon 
X's death. However, in such a case, instead of giving the assets to X's estate, one would 
typically just give X the power to appoint the assets to the creditors of X's estate. This 
would accomplish the estate-tax exposure goal without also exposing X's estate to the ad-
ministrative expenses and creditors' claims described in (1) and (2) of the text. 
43. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-17.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
44. 2 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 1224 (Frederick Deane Goodwin Ribble ed., 2d ed. 
1928) (emphasis in original). 
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tate."45 But, although such a power is sometimes casually referred 
to in conversation as a special power, it is not-it is, properly 
speaking, a "non-general" power of appointment.46 If a non-
general power is what was intended, it would have been better to 
have eliminated any uncertainty by using the federal language, 
i.e., "a power exercisable in favor of anyone other than the dece-
dent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate,"47 in-
stead of "a special power of appointment that is not limited to a 
particular class of persons."48 Based upon the preceding discus-
sion, it would appear that this legislation is flawed. It does not 
respond to a significant problem of general application and, if it is 
to be retained, it should be revised. 
D. Advance Directives-Witnesses-Spouse or Blood Relative 
Article 8 of Title 54.1 is Virginia's Health Care Decisions Act. 
Out of an overabundance of caution, the definition of "witness" 
contained in Article 8 has excluded a spouse or a blood relative 
from serving as a witness to a declarant's written advance direc-
tive.49 The 2005 Session recognized the hardship that these un-
necessary restrictions were creating in some cases, particularly in 
hospital settings where non-family visitors might be rare and 
staff is often prohibited from witnessing documents. Accordingly, 
the prohibitions against spouses and blood relatives were elimi-
nated from the definition of witness and replaced with language 
stating that any person over the age of eighteen years is qualified 
to be a witness.50 The General Assembly made a corresponding 
change to the attestation clause appended to the suggested form 
45. I.RC. § 2041(b)(l) (2000). 
46. After defining "general power" consistently with the estate tax definition found in 
the I.R.C. § 2041(b)(l) (i.e., a power "exercisable in favor the decedent, his estate, his 
creditors, or the creditors of his estate"), the Restatement provides that "[a)ny other power 
of appointment is a non-general one." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANS-
FERS § 11.4(2) (1986). The Restatement no longer employs the term "special power of ap-
pointment." Id. cmt. b. 
47. See I.R.C. § 2041(b)(l). 
48. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-17.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
49. Id. § 54.1-2982 (Repl. Vol. 2002). Prior to the 2005 amendment, the first sentence 
of this definition provided that "'[w]itness' means a person who is not a spouse or blood 
relative of the patient." Id. 
50. Id. § 54.1-2982 (Repl. Vol. 2005). Following the amendment, the first sentence of 
the definition provides that "'[w]itness' means any person over the age of 18, including a 
spouse or blood relative of the declarant." Id. 
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of a written advance directive contained in Virginia Code section 
54.1-2984, by deleting therefrom the sentence "I am not the 
spouse or a blood relative of the declarant."51 
E. Fiduciary Accounting-Vouchers 
Virginia Code section 26-17.9 provides that a fiduciary who is 
required to file annual accounts with a commissioner of accounts 
must support all disbursements with vouchers or receipts.52 When 
the 2003 Session amended Virginia Code section 26-17.9 to au-
thorize fiduciaries to submit front-and-back copies of checks as 
vouchers, it further provided that the commissioner of accounts 
could require fiduciaries "to exhibit the original check or proper 
voucher for a specific payment or for distributions to beneficiaries 
or distributees."53 However, under the federal law known as 
"Check 21,"54 which allows banks to process and transfer checks 
electronically,55 original checks will no longer necessarily be re-
turned to the drawer. In the light of this reality, the 2005 Session 
eliminated the "original check" language from Virginia Code sec-
tion 26-17.9(E) and, for good measure, added a sentence thereto 
providing that "[h]owever, the commissioner of accounts shall not 
require a fiduciary to exhibit an original check as a voucher here-
under."56 
F. Commissioners of Accounts-Fees 
Virginia Code section 26-24 states that "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided, the fees of commissioners of accounts shall be pre-
51. Act of Mar. 20, 2005, ch. 186, 2005 Va. Acts 282 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 54.1-2984 (Repl. Vol. 2005)). The attestation clause now reads in full as follows: 
"The declarant signed the foregoing advance directive in my presence." VA. CODE ANN. § 
54.1-2984 (Repl. Vol. 2005). 
52. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-17.9(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
53. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 201, 2003 Va. Acts 215 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 26-17.9(E) (Repl. Vol. 2004)). 
54. Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 108-100, 117 Stat. 1177 
(2003) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018), was signed on October 28, 2003, and be-
came effective on October 28, 2004. 
55. Id. 
56. Act of Mar. 20, 2005, ch. 261, 2005 Va. Acts 358 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 26-17.9(E) (Cum. Supp. 2005)). 
2005) WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 391 
scribed by the court which appointed them" and, pursuant 
thereto, most courts have entered orders setting forth a schedule 
of fees to be charged by commissioners for their services.57 In re-
sponse to a concern that such fee schedules might establish bind-
ing minimums on commissioners, the 2005 Session amended Vir-
ginia Code section 26-858 to provide that "[e]ach commissioner 
shall have the authority, for any given service he performs, either 
to establish a lesser fee than that prescribed by the court, or to 
waive one or more fees."59 
G. Fiduciary Administration-Virginia Fiduciary Becoming Non-
Resident 
Virginia Code section 26-1.2 requires that every person who 
wishes to qualify as a fiduciary must furnish certain information 
to the court or clerk.60 The 2005 amendment to this section pro-
vides that a fiduciary who becomes a nonresident61 following 
qualification must notify the clerk and the commissioner of ac-
counts of the fiduciary's new address within thirty days thereaf-
ter or be subject to a fifty-dollar civil penalty.62 This same legisla-
57. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-24 (Repl. Vol. 2004). A uniform fee schedule guideline, devel-
oped by the Standing Committee on Commissioners of Accounts of the Judicial Council of 
Virginia, was adopted by the Council on June 17, 1996, and subsequently recommended to 
the circuit courts for their consideration. See Manual for Commissioners of Accounts, 
'll18.2, Recommended Uniform Fee Schedule (2004). 
58. Act of Mar. 21, 2005, ch. 400, 2005 Va. Acts 534 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 26-8 (Cum. Supp. 2005)). It is unclear why this amendment was made to Virginia 
Code section 26-8, which deals with the appointment of commissioners of accounts, instead 
of to Virginia Code section 26-24, entitled "Fees of commissioners of accounts." See VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 26-8, -24 (Repl. Vol. 2004). 
59. Act of Mar. 21, 2005, ch. 400, 2005 Va. Acts 534 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 26-8(C) (Cum. Supp. 2005)). There should be no problem with commissioners of ac-
counts reducing the statutory fees that they may charge because of the ways in which they 
are expressed. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-17.4 (Repl. Vol. 2004) (stating that a fee "shall not 
exceed twenty-five dollars"); id. § 26-17.7(0) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (referring to a fee "not to ex-
ceed twenty-five dollars"); id. § 26-20.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004) (referring to a fee "not to exceed 
seventy-five dollars"); id. § 31-8.2 (Repl. Vol. 2004) (providing that "[t)he commissioner 
shall not charge a fee in excess of$100"). 
60. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-1.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
61. Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 644, 2005 Va. Acts 898 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 26-1.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005)). "For purposes of this section, a person becomes resident 
in another state when he can no longer satisfy the residency requirements specified in § 
38.2-1800.1." VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-1.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
62. Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 644, 2005 Va. Acts 898 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 26-1.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005)). The new rule does not apply if the nonresident has a 
Virginia resident serving as a cofiduciary. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-1.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
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tion also amends Virginia Code section 26-8.1 to give the commis-
sioner of accounts permissive authority to certify the fiduciary's 
failure to comply with Virginia Code section 26-1.2 to the circuit 
court.63 One wonders whether the threat of a possible fifty-dollar 
fine will have a significant motivating impact upon an expatriat-
ing fiduciary. Of far greater significance to the uncooperative ex-
patriate would seem to be the provision already in the law that 
states as follows: 
[U]pon the application of any person who is interested ... [the] com-
missioner of accounts ... shall ... inquire ... whether, by reason of 
... removal of any fiduciary [who is required to file accounts] from 
this Commonwealth ... it is improper to permit the estate of the de-
cedent, ward, or other person, to remain under his control. The result 
of every such examination and inquiry shall be reported by the com-
missioner to the court by which he is appointed and to the clerk of 
such court. 64 
H. Executor and Trustee CompensationBank65-Fee Schedules-
Reasonableness 
1. The Background 
The statutory basis for fiduciary compensation is Virginia Code 
section 26-30, which provides in relevant part that "[t]he commis-
sioner ... shall allow the fiduciary ... except in cases in which it 
is otherwise provided, a reasonable compensation, in the form of a 
commission on receipts or otherwise."66 The premise undergirding 
this rule is the assumption that a commissioner, as an experi-
enced practitioner in this area of the law, can review the file in a 
given case and determine what would be reasonable in the light 
of its specific facts. 67 However, banks have determined that they 
63. Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 644, 2005 Va. Acts 898 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 26-8.1 (Cum. Supp. 2005)). Whereas the amendment to Virginia Code section 26-
1.2 provides that a defaulting fiduciary "shall be subject to a civil penalty of $50," the 
amendment to Virginia Code section 26-8.1 provides that the court "may impose a $50 civil 
penalty." See id. 
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-2 (Repl. Vol. 2004). 
65. Except as the context indicates to the contrary, the word "bank" includes "trust 
company" in the following discussion. 
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-30 (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
67. There is a reasonable factual basis to conclude that the system does not operate in 
this idealistic fashion in the usual case. Instead, one finds that virtually all commissioners 
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wish to take this matter out of the commissioner's hands by mak-
ing their fiduciary fees a matter of agreement with their custom-
ers. Indeed, in the ordinary case, they will not agree to serve as 
an executor or trustee unless the governing document contains a 
compensation clause, such as, for example, the following clause 
found in In re Estate of Fine: "For its services, the bank, or its 
successor, shall receive the compensation stipulated in its regu-
larly published fee schedule in effect at the time such compensa-
tion becomes payable."68 
Notwithstanding the presence of this clause, the commissioner 
of accounts in Fine refused to allow the bank the amount of the 
executor's compensation called for by its fee schedule.69 On appeal 
to the circuit court, the bank argued that the commissioner did 
not have any authority to review its fee because the Supreme 
Court of Virginia had allowed a fee to be fixed by the testator in 
Williams v. Bond.70 However, the Norfolk City Circuit Court af-
firmed the decision of its commissioner and held that under these 
facts 
the testator did not fix the executor's compensation .... [N]either he 
nor [the bank] had any way of knowing what those fees would be in 
futuro. There were no limitations on the fee, and [the bank], in its 
sole discretion, was free to change its published schedule of fees at 
any time for any reason. 
Absent a clear, definite provision setting the compensation of an 
executor, the Court had not only the authority but also the duty to 
inquire as to the reasonableness of the executor's compensation. 71 
have developed a fee schedule based upon a percentage of the assets under the supervision 
and control of an executor or trustee, and that they routinely allow compensation in this 
amount. Generally, it is only in cases where beneficiaries object to the compensation 
claimed, or where a fiduciary claims a higher amount than is routinely allowed, that the 
commissioner of accounts becomes actively involved in fee determinations. 
68. 41 Va. Cir. 597, 598 (Cir. Ct. 1995) (Norfolk City) (emphasis in original). This case 
is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Es· 
tates, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1405, 1418-19 (1998) which, with slight modification, serves as 
the source for this subparagraph (1). 
69. 41 Va. Cir. at 597-98. 
70. 120 Va. 678, 91 S.E. 627 (1917). 
71. Fine, 41 Va. Cir. at 598-99. 
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2. The Bankers' Reply 
The Virginia Bankers Association response to Fine came in the 
2005 Session via an amendment to Virginia Code section 26-30, 
in the following words: 
[W]here the compensation of an institutional fiduciary is specified 
under the terms of the trust or will by reference to a standard pub-
lished fee schedule, the commissioner shall not reduce the compensa-
tion below the amount specified, unless there is sufficient proof that 
i) the settlor or testator was not competent when the trust instru-
ment or will was executed or ii) such compensation is excessive in 
light of the compensation institutional fiduciaries generally receive 
in similar situations. 72 
This legislation raises a number of issues including, but not 
limited to, the following four. First, what is an "institutional fidu-
ciary?" A word search of the Virginia Code discloses no such term, 
and its meaning is unclear. Regardless of what the drafters might 
have been thinking, the issue before the courts will be ''Who did 
the General Assembly intend to be included within the term 
when it passed this legislation?" One wonders, for instance, 
whether "professional corporation[s] engaged in the practice of 
law," which are specifically authorized by statute to serve as ex-
ecutors and trustees, 73 are intended to be within the term. If they 
are not, one further wonders whether there is any legitimate ba-
sis upon which to deny them this legislation's "fee-schedule privi-
lege" when they are competing with banks to provide the same fi-
duciary services?74 Second, what is a "standard" published fee 
schedule and where would one be found? Of course, every bank 
that serves as a fiduciary has its own unique fee schedule and, as 
noted in Fine, the traditional compensation clause in a will or 
trust where a bank is serving refers to "its" unique fee sched-
ule75-but the statute legitimates references to "a standard sched-
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-30 (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
73. Id. § 13.1-546.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999). 
74. The fee schedule provisions of the Guidelines for Fiduciary Compensation adopted 
by the Judicial Council of Virginia in December 2004, discussed in subparagraph (4), infra, 
are equally applicable to all executors and trustees, whether individual or corporate; and 
the provisions for "specified" compensation of trustees, contained in Virginia Code sec-
tion 55-547.08 of the Virginia version of the Uniform Trust Code, discussed in subpara-
graph (3), infra, are equally applicable to all trustees, whether individual or corporate. 
75. Fine, 41 Va. Cir. at 598. 
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ule," not to the fiduciary's unique schedule. 76 Third, does the lan-
guage providing for a "reference to a standard published fee 
schedule" imply a reference to an existing schedule? Again, as 
noted in Fine, the drafting practice is to refer to the schedule "in 
effect at the time such compensation becomes payable."77 Does the 
statute's failure to employ this standard language of futurity 
strengthen the implication that· it is referring to a schedule in ex-
istence when the document in question is executed? Fourth, the 
amendment prohibits the commissioner from reducing the com-
pensation specified in the schedule "unless there is sufficient 
proof that i) the settlor or testator was not competent when the 
trust instrument or will was executed."78 However, it would ap-
pear that if there is sufficient proof of settlor's or testator's in-
competency when the trust or will was signed, the trust or will 
would be declared void and any fee-reduction issue would be 
moot. 
3. The Uniform Trust Code 
The Virginia version of the Uniform Trust Code (''Virginia 
UTC"), which was presented to the 2005 Session by the Virginia 
Bar Association, and enacted effective July 1, 2006, 79 contains the 
following compensation provision:80 
§ 55-547.08. Compensation of trustee.-A. If the terms of a trust do 
not specify the trustee's compensation, a trustee is entitled to com-
pensation that is reasonable under the circumstances. 
B. If the terms of a trust specify the trustee's compensation, the 
trustee is entitled to be compensated as specified, but the court may 
allow more or less compensation if: 
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-30 (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
77. Fine, 41 Va. Cir. at 598. 
78. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-30 (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
79. The Virginia version of the Uniform Trust Code is noted briefly supra, in Part 
II.A, and is discussed in detail in John E. Donaldson & Robert T. Danforth, Annual Survey 
of Virginia Law: The Virginia Uniform Trust Code, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 325 (2005). The 
technical and lobbying efforts of the Virginia Bar Association were handled by the Legisla-
tive Committee of its Section on Wills, Trusts, and Estates. The writer is a member of the 
Legislative Committee. 
80. As introduced, the Virginia UTC stated that "[t)his chapter applies to express 
trusts." S.B. 891, Va. Ckn. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2005). During the legislative process, it 
was amended to read that "[t)his chapter applies to express inter vivos trusts [and it) also 
applies to testamentary trusts, except to the extent ... it is clearly inapplicable to them." 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-541.02(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
396 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:381 
1. The duties of the trustee are substantially different from 
those contemplated when the trust was created; or 
2. The compensation specified by the terms of the trust would 
be unreasonably low or high.81 
As noted in subparagraph (2), supra, the Bankers' amendment 
to Virginia Code section 26-30 provides that the compensation of 
an "institutional" trustee whose fee is determined by reference to 
a "standard" fee schedule is not subject to that section's general 
rule of reasonableness. However, Virginia Code section 26-30 ap-
plies only to trustees operating under the supervision of the 
commissioner of accounts which, for all practical purposes, means 
trustees of testamentary trusts.82 Accordingly, it would appear 
that when an "institutional" trustee is serving as trustee of an in-
ter vivos trust that is not accounting to the commissioner of ac-
counts, its compensation may be reduced pursuant to Virginia 
Code section 55-54 7 .08(B)(2) if it is unreasonably high, notwith-
standing that its fee is determined by reference to a "standard" 
fee schedule. Moreover, as the amendment to Virginia Code sec-
tion 26-30 operates only by prohibiting the commissioner from re-
ducing a fee in the indicated cases, nothing therein prevents the 
commissioner from recommending a fee reduction to the court in 
these very same cases. 
4. The Judicial Council of Virginia 
In December of 2004, the Judicial Council of Virginia adopted a 
six-page document entitled Guidelines for Fiduciary Compensa-
tion,83 that was prepared by its Standing Committee on Commis-
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-547.08 (Cum. Supp. 2005). The Bankers' amendment to Vir-
ginia Code section 26-30, discussed in subparagraph (2), intends to negate this part of the 
Virginia UTC, to the extent it would otherwise apply to institutional trustees specifying 
compensation pursuant to a standard published fee schedule, by providing for the 
amendment to govern "[n]otwithstanding the foregoing provisions or any provision under 
Chapter 31 (§ 55-401 et seq.) of Title 55." Id.§ 26-30 (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
82. Although the amendment to Virginia Code section 26-30 provides for its rule to 
control, "[n]otwithstanding ... any provision under [the Virginia UTC]," this rule never-
theless has a limited scope of operation. It only prohibits the commissioner of accounts 
from reducing the "institutional" trustee's compensation in the indicated cases. Thus, as 
the trustee of the typical inter vivos trust does not account to the commissioner, the 
amendment to Virginia Code section 26-30 has no applicability thereto. 
83. These guidelines will not be widely available until the next edition of the Manual 
for Commissioners of Accounts is issued in 2006, unless the Manual's publisher (Virginia 
CLE) decides to issue a 2005 supplement. A copy of the Guidelines can be obtained from 
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sioners of Accounts.84 On behalf of the Judicial Council, the Ex-
ecutive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia sent copies of 
these Guidelines to all circuit court judges on December 17, 2004, 
explaining that 
[t]he purpose of the Guidelines is to assist the Commissioners with 
the sometimes difficult task of determining "reasonable compensa-
tion," provide fiduciaries with guidance on their fees before they be-
gin their tasks and otherwise promote uniformity of fiduciary fees 
around the Commonwealth. Council is asking that you review these 
Guidelines and consider approving them in principle for use by the 
Commissioners of Accounts in your circuit. 85 
The portion of the Guidelines relating to fee schedules of execu-
tors and trustees provides as follows: 
Where the will states that the Executor shall receive for services the 
compensation set out in a referenced published fee schedule in effect 
at the time such services are rendered, fees as set out in the fee 
schedule shall be presumed to be reasonable, as that term is used in 
§ 26-30. The burden of persuading the Commissioner that fiduciary 
compensation taken according to such a fee schedule is not reason-
able would be on an objecting party. The ultimate responsibility of 
determining the reasonableness of the compensation rests with the 
Commissioner. 86 
5. The Problem 
A combination of protectionism and poor drafting, resulting in 
ambiguity, inconsistency, and conflict, has created an intolerable 
confusion in what should be a relatively straightforward area of 
the law. Fortunately, as most of the issues arise from the 2005 
amendment to Virginia Code section 26-30, which has a delayed 
effective date of July 1, 2006, there is time to resolve them before 
the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia. A copy is also on 
file with the University of Richmond Law Review. 
84. The writer was a member of the Standing Committee from its inception, in Janu-
ary, 1993, to July, 2005. For reasons having nothing to do with the present discussion, he 
voted against the adoption of the Guidelines. 
85. Memorandum from Robert N. Baldwin, Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia, to Circuit Court Judges (Dec. 17, 2004) (on file with the University of Rich-
mond Law Review). 
86. Guidelines for Fiduciary Compensation 'II A{2) (2004). Paragraph A of the Guide-
lines applies to decedent's estates, which explains why paragraph A(2) only refers to the 
compensation of executors. However, paragraph B{2) of the Guidelines states that para-
graph A(2) also applies to trusts and thus the executor language quoted in the text is 
equally applicable to trustees, mutatis mutandis. 
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their impact is felt. It would appear that the only effective way to 
resolve these multi-faceted issues would be for the leaders of the 
Bankers Association, the Bar Association, and the Standing 
Committee to develop compromise legislation for introduction in 
the 2006 Session and, it is submitted, it is incumbent upon them 
to do so. 
III. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
A. Pre-1978 Inter Vivos Trusts-"Direct Lineal Descendants"-
Adopted Persons 
During the period from 1929 to 1931, seven siblings created 
eleven inter vivos trusts, each of which described beneficiar-
ies as "direct lineal descendants" of certain family members, 
thereby leading to the substantive issue decided by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia in McGehee v. Edwards,81 i.e., whether this term 
included adopted persons.88 Virginia Code section 64.1-71.1, 
which provides in part that "[i]n determining the intent of ates-
tator or settlor, adopted persons are presumptively included in 
such terms as ... 'descendants' or similar words of classification 
and are presumptively excluded by such terms as ... 'descen-
dants of the body' or similar words of classification," .also states 
that it "shall apply to all inter vivos trusts executed after July 1, 
1978."89 Nevertheless, the trial court held that, in the absence of 
any evidence bearing on the settlors' actual intent, the term "di-
rect lineal descendants" included adoptees in these pre-1978 
trusts, 
stat[ing] that its decision was guided by a presumption purportedly90 
adopted by other jurisdictions that, if beneficiaries in a class are to 
be identified over a period of time, the grantor intends that changes 
in the law subsequent to the execution of the trust be grafted onto 
provisions of the trust.91 
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion states (1) that 
absent an internal provision to the contrary, "the language of an 
87. 268 Va. 15, 597 S.E.2d 99 (2004). 
88. Id. at 17, 597 S.E.2d at 100. 
89. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002). 
90. It is unclear why the opinion employs this characterization. 
91. McGehee, 268 Va. at 19, 597 S.E.2d at 101. 
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inter vivos trust should be construed according to the law in effect 
at the time the trust is executed,"92 (2) that "[a]t common law, 
adopted persons were not included within the term 'issue,'"93 and 
(3) that the term "direct lineal descendants" is synonymous with 
the term "issue."94 Accordingly, the court rejected the presump-
tion adopted by the trial court and held that "[u]nder the common 
law, then, the grantor did not include adopted persons in the 
phrase 'direct lineal descendants' unless such intent is clear from 
other parts of the document."95 The court also noted that "[t]he 
General Assembly abrogated the common law when it enacted 
Code § 64.1-71.1,'' but that "[b]y its own terms, however, Code § 
64.1-71.1 does not apply to trusts executed before 1978."96 Al-
though they concurred with the substance of the court's opinion, 
two dissenting justices would have reversed the trial court be-
cause, for procedural reasons, it "did not acquire jurisdiction to 
consider" the issue decided by the court. 97 
There are three further matters of interest to the Virginia es-
tates' attorney in connection with this case. First, although a 
premise of the court's opinion, i.e., "[a]t common law, adopted 
persons were not included within the term 'issue,'"98 is flawed, be-
cause, as the court has noted in the past, "[t]he right to adopt 
children was unknown to the common law and is probably inher-
ited from the civil law of Rome, "99 the result in this case is never-
theless supported by the court's prior decisions. 100 Second, in re-
gard to the 1978 statute's presumptive inclusion of adopted 
92. Id., 597 S.E.2d at 102. The opinion further states that "[s]uch a rule is also com-
pelled by Code § 1-16, which mandates that 'no new law shall be construed ... in any 
whatever to affect ... any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law takes effect.'" 
Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. Technically speaking, the statute, "by its own terms," states that it "shall apply 
to all inter vivos trusts executed after July 1, 1978." VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 
2002). 
97. McGehee, 268 Va. at 22, 597 S.E.2d at 103. 
98. Id. at 20, 597 S.E.2d at 102. 
99. Fletcher v. Flanary, 185 Va. 409, 411, 38 S.E.2d 433, 434 (1946). Although 
Fletcher was cited in the McGehee majority opinion, 268 Va. at 20, 597 S.E.2d at 102, it 
was cited for a different point and the court does not mention this aspect of that case. 
100. See Langhorne v. Langhorne, 212 Va. 577, 186 S.E.2d 50, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 
946 (1972) (cited in the principal case at 268 Va. at 20, 597 S.E.2d at 102), and cases cited 
therein. The adoption issue and the Langhorne case are discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, 
Inheritance Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 275, 291-92 (1978). 
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persons in the terms "issue," "descendants," etc., this presump-
tion was not contained in the original 1978 legislation-it was 
added to Virginia Code section 64.1-71.1 in 1987.101 Third, there 
were three other holdings of the trial court, from which no appeal 
was taken, dealing with the rights of illegitimate persons and 
persons conceived through artificial conception to take as "direct 
lineal descendants" in this case.102 
B. Spendthrift Trusts-Exceptions 
In Jackson v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 103 T left 
seventy-five percent of her residuary estate in trust for A and 
twenty-five percent in trust for B.104 Ts will contained a spend-
thrift clause providing in part that "[n]either H, 105 A, or any other 
beneficiary of any other trust under this agreement shall have 
the right ... [to transfer, etc.] ... nor shall any part of the trust 
estate including income, be liable for the debts or obligations of 
any kind of the Beneficiary."106 B, who qualified as administrator, 
101. The 1987 amendments to Virginia Code section 64.1-71.1 were made in response 
to the Supreme Court of Virginia's unfortunate 4-3 decision in Hyman v. Glover, 232 Va. 
140, 348 S.E.2d 269 (1986). The retention of the 1978 effective date when the 1987 
amendments were made evidences the General Assembly's purpose to clarify its original 
intent, in the light of the statute's misinterpretation in Hyman, instead of making any 
substantive change to Virginia Code section 64.1-71.1. This legislation is discussed in J. 
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 21 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 855, 855-57 (1987) and the Hyman case is also discussed, id. 867-69. It might also 
be noted that the 1987 Session, recognizing that some grantors might use deeds as will 
substitutes, also added Virginia Code section 55-49.1 to provide a parallel provision gov-
erning the interpretation of deeds. This legislation is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 855, 858 
(1987). 
102. The trial court held that: 
[T]he term "direct lineal descendants" as used in the various subject trusts is 
to include ... b) persons born out of wedlock to a mother who is a direct lineal 
descendant of an individual referred to in the subject trusts, c) persons born 
out of wedlock to a father who is a direct lineal descendant of an individual 
referred to in the subject trusts, if paternity can be established through scien-
tifically reliable genetic tests; and d) persons conceived through assisted con-
ception where the mother or father is a direct lineal descendant of an indi-
vidual referred to in the subject trusts. 
See Joint Appendix at 106, McGehee, 268 Va. 15, 597 S.E.2d 99 (No. 031595). 
103. 269 Va. 303, 608 S.E.2d 901 (2005). 
104. Id. at 306, 608 S.E.2d at 902. 
105. H, who was Ts husband, would have been the beneficiary of a trust but for having 
predeceased T. Id. at 306 n.1, 608 S.E.2d at 902 n.l. 
106. Id. at 308, 608 S.E.2d at 903. 
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c.t.a., of Ts estate, breached his fiduciary duty to Ts estate re-
sulting in damages of $127,808.60, which were reimbursed to the 
estate by B's surety, S, who, in turn, obtained a personal judg-
ment against B in the same amount. 107 S then brought a gar-
nishment proceeding seeking to reach B's spendthrift trust in 
partial satisfaction of this judgment.108 The first basis upon which 
the trial court held for S was because, as T referred to B only by 
general language-"any other beneficiary of any other trust un-
der this agreement,"109 while referring to A by name, "[TJ in-
tended [B]'s Trust to have less spendthrift protection than [A]'s 
Trust."110 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed this 
fact as "a distinction of no meaning or significance."111 
The second basis for the trial court's holding in favor of S was 
its belief that there is a public policy exception to spendthrift pro-
tection if such protection would "'allow one beneficiary, through 
his or her misconduct, to deprive the other beneficiaries of their 
entitlements."'112 The Supreme Court of Virginia, noting that the 
Commonwealth recognizes spendthrift trusts by statute, 113 also 
noted that the General Assembly has created exceptions thereto 
for certain creditors,114 and cited prior authority for the proposi-
tion that '"[t]he mention of ... specific item[s] in a statute implies 
that other omitted items were not intended to be included in the 
scope of the statute."'115 Notwithstanding the fact that an omis-
107. Id. at 307, 608 S.E.2d at 902-03. 
108. Id., 608 S.E.2d at 903. 
109. Id. at 308, 608 S.E.2d at 903. The use of the word "agreement" suggests that the 
person drafting Ts will might have been copying from a form for an inter vivos trust. 
110. Id. at 307, 608 S.E.2d at 903. 
111. Id. at 310, 608 S.E.2d at 904. 
112. Id. at 307, 608 S.E.2d at 903. It might be noted that as S made complete restitu-
tion to Ts estate, no beneficiary was deprived of an entitlement due to B's defalcation. 
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19 (Repl. Vol. 2003). As a part of the 2005 Session's enact-
ment of the Virginia UTC, this section was repealed and replaced by Virginia Code sec-
tions 55-545.01 to -545.04, which became effective on July 1, 2006. See Act of Apr. 6, 2005, 
ch. 935, 2005 Va. Acts 1793 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.§§ 55-541.01 to -551.06 
(Cum. Supp. 2005)). 
114. The creditors who are granted access to a debtor's spendthrift trust are (i) the 
United States, the Commonwealth, and any county, city or town, (ii) a child who has a 
judgment for child support, and (iii) certain recipients of public assistance. See VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-19 (Repl. Vol. 2003). Under the Virginia UTC, effective July 1, 2006, these ex-
ceptions are retained and a new one is added for "a judgment creditor who has provided 
services for the protection of a beneficiary's interest in the trust." Id. § 55-545.03 (Cum. 
Supp. 2005); see Act of Apr. 6, 2005, ch. 935, 2005 Va. Acts 1793 (codified as amended at 
VA. CODE ANN.§§ 55-541.01to55-551.06 (Cum. Supp. 2005)). 
115. Jackson, 269 Va. at 313, 608 S.E.2d at 906 (quoting Smith Mountain Lake Yacht 
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sion might occur simply because the omitted item was not 
brought to the attention of the General Assembly, instead of hav-
ing been consciously rejected by it, 116 the court held that "because 
the statute specifically lists exceptions to spendthrift protection, 
those exceptions are the only ones allowed by law."117 Accordingly, 
the decision of the trial court was reversed on both counts and fi-
nal judgment was entered on behalf of B's Trustee. 118 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons recited herein, it is respectfully submitted that 
the 2006 Session should (1) amend the mini legal list to include 
custodians under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act and custo-
dial trustees under the Uniform Custodial Trust Act among the 
fiduciaries entitled to its protection, and repeal the ineffectual 
2005 amendment attempting to subordinate the immunity provi-
sion of the mini legal list to the prudent investor rule; 119 and (2) 
repeal or significantly revise the 2005 amendment relating to the 
waiver of trustee accounting for "sole" beneficiaries. 120 
It is further submitted that the Virginia Bankers Association, 
the Virginia Bar Association, and the Standing Committee on 
Commissioners of Accounts should work together to draft legisla-
tion for submission to the 2006 Session that would eliminate the 
problems relating to fiduciary compensation.121 
Club, Inc. v. Ramaker, 261 Va. 240, 246, 542 S.E.2d 392, 395 (2001)). 
116. In this connection the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion stated: 
To affirm the trial court's addition of another exception would violate the 
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under this principle, we have 
held that "when a legislative enactment limits the manner in which some-
thing may be done, the enactment also evinces the intent that it shall not be 
done another way." [Si's argument would require the Court to add an excep-
tion to the statute which the General Assembly has not seen fit to adopt. 
"Courts are not permitted to rewrite statutes. This is a legislative function." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 314, 608 S.E.2d at 906-07. 
119. See supra Part II.B. 
120. See supra Part II.C. 
121. See supra Part II.H. 
